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KILLING THE POLICY TO SAVE THE CHILD: COMPARING 
THE HISTORICAL REMOVAL OF INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN 
AUSTRALIA TO THE UNITED STATES AND HOW THE 
COUNTRIES CAN LEARN FROM EACH OTHER 
 
Drew Pollom* 
 
From the very moment the general government came into existence 
to this time, it has exercised its power over this unfortunate race in 
the spirit of humanity and justice, and has endeavored by every 
means in its power to enlighten their minds and increase their 
comforts, and to save them if possible from the consequences of 
their own vices.1 
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1 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572 (1846). See also Bethany Berger, 
"Power over this Unfortunate Race": Race, Politics and Indian Law in United 
States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1959 (2004). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice Taney’s words, straight from his opinion in 
United States v. Rogers set the tone for federal policy involving 
Indians and Indian tribes (particularly his view that Native 
Americans were an unfortunate race), which reflected the overall 
views of the race at the time, and the role that the U.S. government 
254 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:252 	  
placed itself when legislating Indian issues.2 Taney’s view on race 
was not exclusive to Native Americans as he would espouse a 
similar opinion toward African Americans in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, less than a year later.3 However, his legal views were not 
isolated beliefs and instead reflected language from the 
proclamations of colonial powers when indigenous populations 
were considered subjects under the dominion and control of their 
European Captors.4  Great Britain, for example, addressed Indian 
tribes as “several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom we are 
connected, and who live under our protection” when their country 
issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763.5 This belief carried over 
into the legal analysis for many American jurists. In fact, it became 
so entrenched that Chief Justice Taney declared it was a “useless 
endeavor” to revisit whether subjugation of Native Americans was 
justified.6  Indeed, by the time he wrote the decision in United 
States v. Rogers, Chief Justice Marshall’s words describing the 
relationship of the U.S. to the tribe as “guardian to a ward” had 
been on the books for a little over a decade.7  The lineage of these 
opinions reinforced a commonly held view in America: Native 
Americans were part of an inferior race who needed protection 
from civilized guardians.  
At first, those guardians were the colonial powers such as 
Great Britain and France. Following the guardianship under 
established colonial powers like Great Britain and France, the 
United States assumed the role of warden over Indian communities. 
This legal principle, that the colonial power was the guardian of 
the indigenous populations, also treated the indigenous native 
populations as individuals, not bound together by a sovereign 
government, but instead bounded by a shared ethnicity. 8  The 
United States took their racial viewpoint of the tribes and devised 
legislation to break their traditional communal bounds. As a result, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572.  
3 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 422 (1856) superseded (1868).  
4 Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572. 
5  The Royal Proclamation - October 7, 1763, THE AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/proc1763.asp. 
6 Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572. 
7 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 10 (1831). 
8 Berger, supra note 1. 
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millions of Native American children were removed from their 
homes and placed in boarding schools.  
Thousands of miles away, Australia began its history of 
systematic removal of its indigenous populations. Although 
Australia only had one colonial power, Great Britain, the policy 
towards the Aboriginals ultimately led to similar removal policies 
that were witnessed in the United States. When Europeans first 
occupied Australia, brutal battles over land, water, and food were 
typical of the race relations between the White European settlers 
and the indigenous Aboriginals. 9  Throughout the decades, 
Aboriginal children were kidnapped by the settlers and used for 
labor. 10  Additionally, to instill European work habits, the 
Australian government and missionaries forced the removal of 
indigenous children from their homes and delivered them to the 
homes of settlers and other groups.11  The Australian governments 
eventually decided to assign total control of the indigenous 
populations (hereafter referred to as “Aborigines” or “Aboriginal”) 
to the Chief Protector.12 This made the Chief Protector the legal 
guardian of all Aboriginal children within Australia.13 Under the 
auspices of the Chief Protector, the practice of removing 
Aboriginal children from their homes reigned for decades until 
1969. 14  The children that were removed from their Aboriginal 
communities became collectively known as the “Stolen 
Generations.” 
In addition to sharing a common colonial history, the United 
States and Australia have a shared understanding of the difficulties 
now facing government-native relations. Specifically, each 
government has struggled to address the historical treatment of the 
indigenous populations. Particularly difficult is addressing the 
historical removal of native children.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Gina Bonica, Current Development: The Destruction of Australian 
Aboriginals: From Breach of Duty to Cultural Genocide, 7 NEW ENG. INT'L & 
COMP. L. ANN. 227, 227 (2001).  
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 Id. 
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The United States has attempted to combat the removal of 
Native American children from their homes through the Indian 
Child Welfare Act. 15  This important piece of legislation was 
developed and passed in the 1970s, was a product of the rising 
concerns of the separation of a large number (one out of three) of 
Native American children from their families, often without 
justification.16  Like many cases in Australia, the removal of native 
children in the United States was all too often unwarranted. 17 
Congress, compelled to address the problem, passed the Indian 
Child Welfare Act (ICWA).18 ICWA set the federal requirements 
used in cases of adoption of Native American children. 19  For 
ICWA to apply to a Native American child, the child must be a 
member, or eligible to be a member, of a federally recognized 
tribe.20 However, the law itself is not perfect, and new case law has 
further undermined its application in certain cases. The recent 
United States Supreme Court decision, Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl21, displays some of the issues where courts have narrowed the 
scope of ICWA, thus potentially leaving certain indigenous 
children outside of its protections. Specifically, in that case, the 
court held that ICWA only applied to children as part of an 
existing Indian family, 22  which would dramatically narrow the 
applicability of ICWA. Understanding the challenges that cases 
like Adoptive Couple present, ICWA advocates both inside and 
outside of the government have worked together to produce new 
guidelines that clarify the law and counteract rulings like Adoptive 
Couple that will make sure ICWA encompasses all child custody 
involving Native American children. 
While the advocates in the U.S. fight for ICWA, a different 
battle is being waged in Australia.  The primary issue facing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901–63 ( West 1978). 
16 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013). 
17 Bonica, supra note 9, at 277. 
18 Id.   
19 Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, NATIONAL INDIAN CHILD WELFARE 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.nicwa.org/indian_child_welfare_act (last visited May 
12. 2016). 
20 Id. 
21 Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2557 (2013). 
22 Id. 
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Australian government is how to address appropriately the 
mounting claims and litigation related to the country’s “Stolen 
Generations.” The Stolen Generations included countless 
Aborigines whom the government removed from their homes as 
children.23 Australia was tasked with determining the appropriate 
redress for the acts committed by their government. Cubillo v. 
Commonwealth and Trevorrow v. South Australia, demonstrate the 
difficulty facing Australian courts from litigants claiming damages 
stemming from the systemic removal of Aboriginal children from 
their homes, as well as frame the difficulties obtaining redress. 
Although each country has their distinct set of problems, both 
countries can learn from each other and can address their problems 
through new legislation. Australia, having dealt with high-level 
litigation into compensation for Stolen Generation members, 
would benefit from new laws that address compensation claims for 
historical Aboriginal removal. Similarly, new Aboriginal adoption 
laws that take into account Aboriginal culture and customs, with an 
emphasis on keeping Aboriginal children in their traditional 
communities, would curb the needless removal of children from 
their communities. For the United States, the best path forward is 
to amend ICWA to address directly recent Supreme Court cases 
that have narrowed its application. Relying on the unique powers 
that Congress has over Indian Affairs, these amendments will be 
able to supersede the narrowing case law.  
This Article addresses both the historical removal of 
indigenous children and the contemporary issues that now face 
each country in addressing that history. Part I of this Article traces 
the historical developments that led to the removal of Aboriginal 
children in Australia and Native American children in the United 
States; including how the United States’ policy of being a 
“guardian” to the tribes extended to removing Indian children and 
placing them in boarding schools. This Part also includes how 
Australia’s policy towards its Aboriginal population led to the 
mass removal of Aboriginal children to non-Aboriginal homes and 
institutions.  Part II of this Article then explores the Indian Child 
Welfare Act in the United States and decisions of the Australian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Bonica, supra note 9, at 227. 
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courts in Cubillo and Trevorrow. Part III identifies lessons that 
each nation can learn from the other when devising methods to 
address adequately the issues regarding Indian child removal. 
Specifically, Australia needs to adopt uniform laws that not only 
address the compensation issues highlighted by Cubillo and 
Trevorrow, but also adopt its ICWA–style scheme for future 
Aboriginal adoptions. For the United States, direct amendments to 
ICWA represent the best solution, clarifying the scope of the act as 
superseding decisions such as Adoptive Couple. 
 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: HOW THE USA AND AUSTRALIA 
REMOVED INDIGENOUS CHILDREN 
The United States and Australia came to the conclusion, 
independent of one another, that assimilation of their native 
populations into their contemporary society was necessary. In each 
country, the policy of assimilation included the forced and 
complete removal of indigenous children from their tribal 
communities. The United States commissioned boarding schools 
that taught Indian children western values and divorced them from 
their traditional community values as part of the assimilation 
process. Australia, on the other hand, took a different approach to 
removing children from their communities and traditional values 
by placing them in the hands of missionary groups. Regardless of 
the methodology, both countries’ tactics attempted to reach the 
same goal: stripping indigenous children of their traditional 
cultural identity and assimilating them into the mainstream culture.  
 
A. United States of America 
The relationship between Native Americans and the United 
States government has always been complicated, but it has 
undergone multiple transformations. Each transformation and 
respective era is defined by either a court case, such as the era of 
the Rogers’ decision, or legislative action, such as the General 
Allotment Act of 188724 (denoting the allotment and assimilation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The General Allotment Act of 1887 (codified as 25 U.S.C. 9 §§ 331–58 
(1887)). 
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era of Federal Indian policy). In the “formative years,”25 Congress 
dealt with the Indian tribes using both treaties and statutes. 26 
Through the treaties, the United States meant to deal with tribes 
honestly. Secretary of War Henry Knox, who led the first 
negotiations for early treaties, declared: 
 
[T]he United States have pledged themselves for the 
protection of the said [I]ndians within the 
boundaries described by the said treaty and that the 
principles of good Faith and sound  policy and 
every respect which a nation, owes to its own 
reputation and dignity require if the union possess 
sufficient power that it be exerted to enforce a due 
observance with the treaty.27 
 
The formative years of treaty making gave way in 1871 to what 
is known as the Allotment and Assimilation Era.28 During this Era, 
the United States adopted the policy of removing Native American 
children from their homes and placing them in boarding schools. 
The United States was, in effect, attempting to integrate Native 
American children into contemporary society. This policy lasted 
through two subsequent eras, the Indian Reorganization Era,29 and 
the Termination Era.30 The practice of taking children from their 
indigenous homes did not end until the current era of Self-
Determination.31 Starting in 1961, federal policy focused on self-
governance allowing each tribe to create policy and govern 
themselves.32 Each era of federal policy guides the treatment of 
Native Americans. For example, it was the policies of the 
Assimilation and Allotment Era that made the Indian boarding 
schools possible, just as the policies underlying the Self-
Determination Era helped spur Congress to pass ICWA. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §1.03 (2012 ed.). 
26 Id. 
27 DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 12–13 (Francis Paul Prucha 
ed., 3d 2000). 
28 COHEN, supra note 25, §1.04 
29 Id. §1.05. 
30 Id. §1.06. 
31 Id. §1.07. 
32 Id. 
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1. The Rogers Court-Backdrop for Discriminatory Policies 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Rogers centered on the federal government’s invasion into tribal 
sovereignty.33 The Rogers decision rested upon the premise that 
Native Americans were racially inferior to their Caucasian 
counterparts.  
In 1844, William Rogers allegedly stabbed his brother-in-law, 
Jacob Nicholson, to death.34 Although both men were white, each 
married members of the Cherokee Nation.35 By Tribal law, Rogers 
was a citizen of the Cherokee Nation through his marriage. 36 
Moreover, the crime was allegedly committed in Cherokee 
territory, West of Arkansas.37 Rogers was charged with the murder 
of his brother. When the case came to trial, Rogers claimed the 
United States district court did not have jurisdiction over him 
because he was a member of the Cherokee Nation.38 Rogers had 
the power of a treaty on his side: The 1835 Treaty of New 
EchoStar (“the Treaty”) between the Cherokee and the United 
States. The Treaty established tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
on Cherokee Lands.39 The Treaty also protected tribal jurisdiction 
under federal law.40 Pursuant to the Treaty, the federal government 
lacked the authority to interfere with Cherokee law.41 Nevertheless, 
the Court rejected Rogers’ argument and held that Rogers did not 
become an Indian when he married into the Cherokee tribe.42 In 
this opinion, Taney wrote that the Indian tribes were an 
“unfortunate race,” reflecting the evolution of the treatment of 
tribes by the law.43  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See Generally, United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 576 (1846). 
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38 Rogers, 45 U.S. at 570.  
39 Berger, supra note 1, at 1971. 
40 Id. at 1972. 
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42 Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572. 
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From the Great Proclamation of 1763 to Justice Marshall’s 
statement “ward to guardian” 44  in Cherokee Nation to Taney’s 
words in Rogers, treatment of individual Native Americans was 
based on race and the treatment of each tribe was based on a racial 
bond. This legal analysis provides a backdrop into why three 
decades later, U.S. policymakers decided to assimilate Native 
Americans into the contemporary society. Their engine of change 
was the Dawes Act, beginning the Allotment and Assimilation Era.  
 
2. The Dawes Act & the Legacy of Boarding Schools 
In the decades following the Rogers decision, the federal 
government turned to a policy of assimilating Native Americans 
into American society. This assimilation policy manifested into 
two actions: individual allotment of reservation land and removal 
of native children into boarding schools.45 In search of ways to use 
what much of the United States considered to be “unused” lands, 
Congress established the General Allotment Act of 1887.46  
The General Allotment Act of 1887, also known as the Dawes 
Act, dealt with what the United States considered to be “unused 
lands.”47 The Dawes Act effectively broke up reservation lands 
into 160-acre and 80-acre parcels. The title of each parcel of land 
was given to the head of the Indian household.48 The purpose of 
the Dawes Act was to provide American Indians with their own 
parcel of land rather than having the tribe own the land 
collectively.49 Tribal members could then keep the land or sell the 
individual parcels to Indians or non-Indians. The Dawes Act was 
another attempt to assimilate Native Americans into the American 
mainstream culture by breaking the link between individual Native 
Americans and their traditional communal culture.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 11 (1831). 
45 Id. 
46 The General Allotment Act of 1887 (codified as 25 U.S.C. 9 §§ 331–58 
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47 Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572. 
48 Id. 
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The second major policy decision adopted by the United States 
government was the reformation of Indian education. 50  The 
educational reforms for Native American children led to the 
formation of boarding schools built specifically for Native 
American children. The purpose of these schools was to teach 
Native American children capitalistic values in order to accelerate 
the assimilation process. 51  Richard Pratt, the founder of the 
influential Carlisle Indian Industrial School, was responsible for 
the curriculum taught to all Native American children throughout 
the country during this era.52 Pratt based his policy on a simple 
mantra “Kill the Indian, save the man.” 53  This philosophy 
represented a dramatic and extreme example of assimilation.54 In 
Pratt’s view, the only way to educate and civilize a Native 
American child was to remove them from their “primitive” family 
settings.55 Through removal, the children could assimilate into the 
American society, and therefore would be considered civilized 
individuals.  
The United States authorized the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs to institute rules regarding attendance in Indian schools, 
and to provide funds to transport the children from the reservations 
to the schools.56 To implement these policies, the Commissioner 
employed unsavory methods to coerce Indian parents into sending 
their children away. 57  For example, government rations were 
intentionally withheld from families, forcing the Indian parent to 
choose between starving their children or sending them to boarding 
schools where they would be fed.58 Often parents would choose the 
latter.  
Once at the schools, the goal of ridding Native American 
children of their culture and replacing it with Euro-American 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 .Ann Haag, The Indian Boarding School Era and its Continuing Impact on 
Tribal Families and the Provision of Government Services, 43 TULSA L. REV. 
149, 151 (2007).  
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culture was realized. 59  Boarding schools required English-only 
instruction, demanding that Native American children speak 
English, and effectively purging Native American populations of 
their traditional languages. The impact of English-only education 
on traditional languages was catastrophic.  When European settlers 
first arrived in North America, there were over 300 known 
languages spoken by tribal communities. By 1997, nearly half of 
the native languages in the United States ceased to exist.60 
The catalyst behind each assimilation measure can be traced 
back to the main point espoused by Chief Justice Taney in Rogers: 
The belief that tribal policies and cultural beliefs were antiquated, 
and therefore, inferior to the European-based society created in the 
United States. The government’s goal to separate Native 
Americans from their cultural identity and absorb them into the 
greater American society had a dramatic impact on tribal 
communities across the United States.  
 
B. Australia 
The history of Australian-Aboriginal relations follows similar 
tangents that colored the relationship between the United States 
and the Native American tribes. It also shows some of the same 
hallmarks of the complexity of defining race within the Aboriginal 
group. 
Aboriginal-Australian relations can trace back to the very first 
set of colonies starting in New South Wales. Authorities’ version 
of reaching out to the Aboriginal population, began with the 
capturing of individual Aboriginals. In the very first year of the 
New South Wales colony, Governor Arthur Phillips ordered the 
capture and imprisonment of two Aboriginal people. 61 Among 
Phillips’ thoughts, was the hope that keeping the Aboriginal people 
separate from their “primitive” society could “civilize” the two 
men.62 By attempting to separate these men from their indigenous 
culture, Phillips hoped the men could become emissaries to the rest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Id. at 155. 
60 Id. at 158. 
61 PETER READ, A RAPE OF THE SOUL SO PROFOUND: THE RETURN OF THE 
STOLEN GENERATIONS 17 (Allen & Unwin 1982). 
62 Id. 
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of the Aboriginal people and help bring about the same change that 
occurred to the two original Aboriginals that he had imprisoned.63 
This behavior, and others like it, set the stage for the systemic 
taking of Aboriginal children. 
Massive intervention by the Australian government in the lives 
of Aboriginal families reached its zenith in the twentieth-century 
Aboriginal Australia. 64 The legal engine driving the intervention 
was the ironically named Aboriginal Protection Acts.65 By 1911, 
the Acts were passed by all of the Australian mainland state 
governments. 66  The series of laws allowed for the permanent 
removal of children from their homes.67  Similar to the policies 
instituted in the United States, the Australian officials believed that 
the separation of the children was for their betterment. A 1911 
report produced by the New South Wales (NSW) Aboriginal 
Protection Board exemplified the Australian policy of “separation-
for-their-own-good,” claiming that: “The only chance these 
children have is to be taken away from their present environment 
and properly trained by earnest workers before being apprenticed 
out, and having once left the aborigines’ reserves they should 
never be allowed to return to them permanently.”68 
By 1950, the removal of Aboriginal children from their homes 
had reached its apex.69 One in three or four Aboriginal children 
was removed from their homes in New South Wales 70  All 
Australian states and territories, except Tasmania possessed a 
number of well-known, and now notorious institutions of church 
and state in which Aboriginal children had been taken and 
incarcerated for decades.71 Often, these institutions would commit 
terrible deeds toward Aboriginal children.72 One example of the 
mistreatment of the Aboriginal children is the tale of a fifteen-year-	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old girl at Moor River in Western Australia. 73 She was imprisoned 
in a miniature cell for 67 days during 1918–1919 for repeatedly 
attempting to run away to rejoin her family.74 The story of the 
fifteen-year-old girl at Moor River is a brief window into the 
treatment that typified the era and life of members of the Stolen 
Generations. Through the Aboriginal Protection Boards, thousands 
of children were forcibly removed from their homes and brought to 
these institutions. Although the institutions themselves were 
privately-run, it is the argument that they operated with the 
blessing of the Australian government that would later form the 
basis of the tort claims in Cubillo and Trevorrow. 
 
II. RECONCILIATION, LEGISLATION, AND LITIGATION: AUSTRALIA 
AND THE UNITED STATES MOVE AWAY FROM ASSIMILATION 
In the decades after the dismantling of policies that predicated 
the removal of children, the governments of the United States and 
Australia have grappled with the unanticipated aftermath. While 
the United States focused on stopping future harm while 
attempting to emphasize the cultural integrity of the tribes, 
Australia focused more on issues pertaining to litigation, 
specifically on handling claims from Aboriginals who were taken 
from their homes as children. Although the root of the problems 
that each country face are similar, the solutions and difficulties that 
they face have diverged.  
 
A. United States 
For the United States government, the issue of child removal 
now surrounds the ICWA.75 Since its passage, the statute has set 
the standards for adoptions and child placement of Native 
Americans. Recent litigation has sought to narrow, and even 
dismantle, the framework set for in the statute. The recent case of 
Adoptive Couple represents the best high-profile decision that has 
narrowed the scope of ICWA. 
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1. Indian Child Welfare Act 
Congress passed the ICWA in response to the mass 
displacement of Native American children.76 During the 1970s, the 
U.S. government started a new federal policy that became known 
as the Self-Determination Era.77 In the 1970s, the federal policy of 
self-determination in social welfare and education became 
important aims as part of the new policy. Native American tribes 
and organizations and the extent of the Indian child welfare crisis 
had to be assessed before responsive legislation could be drafted.78 
The Association of American Indian Affairs began to document 
the removal of Indian children from the homes, along with the 
impacts of removal on the children themselves. 79  Conservative 
estimates at the time suggested that one-third of all Indian children 
had been removed from their homes and placed in foster homes, 
adoptive care, or educational institutions.80 Furthermore, at least 85 
percent of the placements were in non-Indian homes and 
institutions, with a high proportion of the children residing out of 
state.81 For instance, in 1971, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
school census showed that 34,538 American Indian children lived 
in institutional facilities rather than at home.82 
Once the Indian child welfare crisis was brought forward, 
Congress, along with numerous Native tribes, was tasked with 
developing legislation to tackle the issue. 83 In 1978, Congress 
passed the Indian Child Welfare Act, declaring: 
 
It is the policy of this Nation to protect the best 
interests of Indian children and to promote the 
stability and security of Indian tribes and families 
by the establishment of minimum Federal standards 
for the removal of Indian children from their 
families and the placement of such children in foster 	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82 Id. 
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or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique 
values of Indian culture, and by providing for 
assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child 
and family service programs.84 
 
ICWA had several goals, including the reversal of historical 
practices and policies that led to the massive removal of Indian 
children and subsequent placement in institutions.85 ICWA mainly 
combats this problem in two ways. First, under ICWA, tribes have 
exclusive jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding involving 
an Indian child. 86   If the Indian child does not reside on the 
reservation of their tribe, and the custody proceeding is in state 
court, then the state court has to transfer the proceeding to the 
tribal court of the tribe in which the Indian child is enrolled.87  
ICWA achieves this goal through the use of placement preferences 
separated into two categories: adoptive placement preferences and 
foster care preferences.88 For adoptive place preferences, an Indian 
child is preferably adopted by 1) a member of the child’s extended 
family; 2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or 3) other 
Indian families. For foster care, the placement preferences are 1) a 
member of the Indian child’s extended family; 2) a foster home 
licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child’s tribe; 3) an 
Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-
Indian licensing authority; or 4) an institution for children 
approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization 
which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child’s needs.89 
A resulting consequence of the implementation of ICWA was 
the difficulty of determining custody of American Indian children. 
ICWA defines child custody hearings as any proceeding involving 
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85 Id. at 18. 
86 15 U.S.C. § 1911(a) repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 
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87 15 U.S.C. § 1911(b) repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 
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foster care placements. 90  The American Law Reports have 
attempted to analyze the ICWA and its application in child custody 
hearings. 91 Courts have determined that for the ICWA to apply, 
the child at the center of the custody proceedings must meet the 
criteria of an “Indian child.” 92  From there it gets complicated: 
“Some courts have found that the ICWA applies to the parental 
rights of unmarried fathers (2[a]); another authority has held that 
the statute is inapplicable in the absence of acknowledgment of 
paternity (§ 12[b]).”93 
Once a child has been determined to be an Indian Child, the 
tribe can assert its exclusive jurisdiction and have the proceeding 
transferred to tribal court. 94  There, the defined preferences for 
placement of an Indian child become apparent.95 If an Indian child 
is placed in foster care or a predictive placement, preference 
should first be given to the members of the Indian child's extended 
family, followed by a foster home approved by the tribe, 
subsequently by an Indian foster home licensed by a non-Indian 
licensing authority.  If none of these options are available, the child 
should be placed at an institution for children that has either been 
approved by the tribe or operated by an Indian organization that 
has a program to meet the child's needs.96 
In addition to placement preferences, the Act also gives 
detailed instructions in the event that a Native American intends to 
forfeit their rights to their child.  An Indian parent can consent to 
termination of the parental rights; the consent must be in writing, 
made before the judge in the competent jurisdiction, and 
accompanied by a certificate from that judge that gives a full 
explanation of the consequences of the consent and comprehension 	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Annotation, Construction and Application of Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 
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by the parent.97 Whether a tribal member consented to forfeiture of 
their rights to the child, and whether the tribal court had 
jurisdiction became part of the key legal facts in the latest case 
involving ICWA and child custody hearings: Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl.  
 
2. Adoptive Couple and the Existing Family Doctrine 
In Adoptive Couple, the child was born to Birth Mother 
(Mother) who was Hispanic, and Biological Father (Father), a 
member of the Cherokee Nation. 98  Father and Mother were 
engaged in December 2008; one month later Mother informed 
Father that she was pregnant.99 By May of 2009, the relationship 
between Mother and Father deteriorated to the point that the 
engagement was called off.100 Eventually, the mother decided to 
put Baby Girl up for adoption.101 Because the father was a member 
of the Cherokee Indian Tribe, the mother of the child contacted the 
Cherokee nation through her attorney. 102  When providing the 
information to the Cherokee Nation, the Mother misspelled the 
Father’s name in addition to providing an incorrect birthdate.103 
Based on the information she provided, the Cherokee Nation could 
not verify whether Father was an enrolled member of the Tribe.104 
At the same time, the mother met the Adoptive Couple, located 
in South Carolina, through a private adoption agency. 105  The 
relationship progressed to the point that the Adoptive Couple 
supported Mother both financially and emotionally throughout her 
pregnancy.106 On September 15, 2009, the child was born, and the 
mother signed a notice terminating her parenting rights. 107 
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Adoptive Couple took Baby Girl from the hospital to their home in 
South Carolina.108 
Approximately four months after the adoption, the Adoptive 
Couple notified the father of the pending adoption.109  The father 
signed papers saying he was not contesting the adoption but later 
claimed that he thought he was relinquishing his rights to Mother, 
not the Adoptive Couple. 110  After consulting with an attorney, 
Father filed a motion in South Carolina to stay the adoption.111 A 
trial took place in South Carolina Family Court in 2011, by which 
time Baby Girl was two years old.112 The family court denied the 
adoption and on December 27, 2011, Baby Girl was handed over 
to her biological father.113  When reviewing the facts of the case, 
Justice Alito, writing the majority opinion for the United States 
Supreme Court, noted that Baby Girl had never met her biological 
father until she was handed over to her father.114  
At the state level, the South Carolina State Supreme Court 
affirmed the family court’s decision and the Indian child remained 
with her father.115 In doing so, the court held that two different 
provisions of the ICWA barred the termination of father’s parental 
rights.116 First, the court held that the Adoptive Couple had not 
complied with § 1913(d) of the ICWA, which requires a showing 
of “active efforts . . . were made to provide remedial services and 
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the 
Indian family.”117 Second, the court concluded that that Adoptive 
Couple had not met § 1912(f) requirements that Biological 
Father’s “custody of Baby Girl would result in serious emotional 
or physical harm to her beyond a reasonable doubt.”118 When the 
case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Alito 
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rejected these arguments in his majority opinion.119 Going directly 
to § 1912(f), Justice Alito tackled the issue of an involuntary 
termination of an Indian parental right. Justice Alito emphasized 
that the statute focuses on the language of continued custody.120 
The reading of “continued custody” is important to deconstructing 
Justice Alito’s opinion: 
 
“[t]he ICWA was designed to counteract was the 
unwarranted removal of Indian children from Indian 
families due to the cultural insensitivity and biases 
of social workers and state courts. The statutory text 
expressly highlights the primary problem that the 
statute was intended to solve: “an alarmingly high 
percentage of Indian families [were being] broken 
up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their 
children from them by nontribal public and private 
agencies.”121 
 
In essence, Justice Alito did not believe that an Indian family 
was being broken up, instead, he noted “[h]ere, the adoption of an 
Indian child is voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian 
parent with sole custodial rights.”122 Justice Alito further remarked 
that it was not disputed that Father did not have physical custody 
nor legal custody at the time of the adoption.123 Therefore, Father 
could not invoke § 1912(f) to bar the adoption, since “ICWA’s 
primary goal of preventing the unwarranted removal of Indian 
children and the dissolution of Indian families is not 
implicated.” 124 Justice Alito applied this same analysis to the 
second ICWA provision implicated, section § 1912(d). The 
opinion indicated that the law “applies only in cases where an 
Indian family’s ‘breakup’ would be precipitated by the termination 
of the parent’s rights.”125 Again, Alito focused on the fact that an 
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Indian family is not currently being broken up.126 Alito’s decision 
in the case led to Baby Girl’s return to Adoptive Couple.  
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the majority 
had used a single clause, continued custody, to render the entirety 
of the statute inapplicable. 127  She pointed out that it was 
undisputed that Father was the biological father of Baby Girl, and 
as a result Baby Girl was an Indian child under ICWA. 128 The 
language of the statute holds that the ICWA applies in any child 
custody hearing involving an American Indian child.129  Justices 
Alito and Sotomayor set up a future dilemma for the Court. On one 
hand there is Alito’s substantive argument, resting on the 
foundation that the ICWA was intended to stop breakup of Indian 
families, not assert noncustodial rights over custodial rights. On 
the other is Justice Sotomayor's procedurally-based opinion. In 
Sotomayor’s world, the ICWA always applies to a child custody 
hearing regardless of whether the Indian parent originally had 
custody of the child. 
 
3. ICWA Guidelines and constitutional challenges: ICWA 
Post-Adoptive Couple developments 
Since the Supreme Court decision in Adoptive Couple, it’s been 
unclear how Justice Alito’s “Existing Indian Family” doctrine, was 
unclear would impact the child custody proceedings. The ruling 
cases arising in Washington, 130  Michigan, 131  Wyoming, 132 
Alaska, 133  California, 134  Montana, 135  Nebraska, 136  North 
Carolina,137 and Oklahoma138 have all cited back to the Adoptive 
Couple decision. However, the central premise of the Adoptive 	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Couple decision is being challenged right now through new 
guidelines promulgated by the BIA.  
On February 25, 2015, the BIA issued new guidelines for state 
courts and agencies in Indian country proceedings. 139  Assistant 
Secretary of the Interior Kevin Washburn pointed to cases like 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl as the impetus for finding a better 
way to ensure compliance with the ICWA guidelines.140 Secretary 
Washburn acknowledged that while they are unable to overturn the 
decision in Adoptive Couple via new rules and guidelines, the new 
guidelines provide a means to strengthen the original intent of 
ICWA. 141  Under the proposed guidelines, the BIA specifically 
states, “[t]here is no exception to application of ICWA based on 
the so-called ‘existing Indian family doctrine.’”142 As a result, the 
guidelines treat factors such as whether the Indian child 
participates in or observes tribal customs as part of the non-
exhaustive list of factors that courts need to use to determine 
whether ICWA application is appropriate.143 These factors, in turn, 
impact the level of involvement that the tribe would have during 
state court proceedings.144 The guidelines also dictate that state 
courts and agencies must always ask, and investigate, if the child 
in the middle of an adoption proceeding qualifies as an Indian 
child. 145 
The proposed guidelines appear to address directly the existing 
family doctrine from the Adoptive Couple decision without 
attempting to overthrow the decision itself. However, the 
guidelines have not been without controversy. In May 2015, the 
National Council for Adoption sued the Department of Interior 
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over the guidelines. 146  The National Council for Adoption’s 
complaint focused on whether the 2015 ICWA guidelines violated 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).147 Specifically, whether 
the rules violated the notice and comment sections of the APA.148  
Under the APA, any new rules or regulations by any government 
agency have to go through a specific process that puts the public 
on notice of the new rules or regulations and allows the public to 
comment on those changes.149 The National Council for Adoption 
asserted that the BIA did not follow these rules because the actual 
rulemaking process for the guidelines was never made public.150 
However, the complaint went beyond attacking the new rules 
under APA to attacking ICWA on constitutional grounds. The 
complaint also alleged that the “2015 Guidelines self-consciously 
violate[d] . . . the United States Constitution by instructing state 
courts to violate the due process and equal protection rights of 
‘Indian Children’ and the birth parents of such children, and by 
commandeering the resources of state child-welfare agencies and 
state courts.”151 This constitutional attack is also being raised by a 
separate lawsuit filed by the Goldwater Institute.152 The Goldwater 
Institute has used similar language concerning due process rights 
in another lawsuit.153 In that lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
entire scheme of ICWA was unconstitutional because ICWA 
includes the ancestry of Indian children. 154  According to the 
plaintiffs, this means that: 
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Children with Indian ancestry, however, are still 
living in the era of Plessy v. Ferguson. Alone 
among American children, their adoption and foster 
care placements are determined not in accord with 
their best interests but by their ethnicity, as a result 
of a well-intentioned but profoundly flawed and 
unconstitutional federal law, the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (“ICWA”), codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 
1901–1963.155 
 
Litigation like A.D. v. Washburn is ongoing and unresolved. 
ICWA advocates need to keep an eye on these cases as they have 
potential consequences for the statute as a whole. If a case like 
A.D. were to strike down the entire ICWA framework on 
constitutional grounds, then any discussion of improving ICWA 
will strictly be academic.  
 
4. Takeaway 
In many ways, ICWA is both a reactive and proactive measure. 
It is reactive because its passage was meant to stop the practice of 
the removal of Indian Children. It is proactive because its 
provisions are designed to prohibit the future removal of Indian 
children. However, as the decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 
shows, the statute in its current state is under attack, where courts 
interpret provisions in a way that deprives tribal jurisdiction in 
situations where an Indian Child is involved. Attempts to narrow 
the scope of the statute are under way, and the existing family 
doctrine is just one avenue in which that strategy is being carried 
out.  The new ICWA guidelines show a concerted effort by the 
BIA to counter-act the “existing Family doctrine.” However, 
National Council for Adoption v. Jewell and A.D. v. Washburn 
point out that in its current state, ICWA will remain under constant 
attack from litigation that will try to narrow the scope of the statute 
or strike the statute down. Advocates for the law will need to take a 
more stringent role in improving and strengthening the law from 
this point forward.  
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B. Australia 
Unlike in the United States, the reaction to the Stolen 
Generations in Australia has not been to pass proactive legislation 
stopping future removals. Instead, what has emerged is complex 
litigation arising out of the policies of Aboriginal removal. Two 
cases in particular, Trevorrow v. South Australia, and Cubillo v. 
Commonwealth stand out as landmark decisions that have affected 
Stolen Generation litigants’ ability to sue in court.  
 
1. Cubillo: a Foot in the Door for the “Stolen Generations” 
Cubillo v. Commonwealth represented one of the first cases 
involving members of the Stolen Generations against the 
Commonwealth. 156  Two Stolen Generation members, Lorna 
Cubillo and Peter Gunner, sued for wrongful imprisonment, breach 
of statutory duty, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty arising 
out of their removal from their central Australian Aboriginal 
mothers. 157  The Commonwealth of Australia was the only 
defendant in their suit. 158  The goal of the suit was to make 
Australia accountable for their backing of the taking of Aboriginal 
children by third parties. By holding the government liable, the 
plaintiffs of Cubillo hoped to open the door for other members of 
the Stolen Generations to also bring claims against the government.  
 
a. Lorna Cubillo: A Background 
Lorna Cubillo’s story starts out like many members of the 
Stolen Generation, removal from her home as a child. Lorna was 
taken from her community at the Phillip Creek Native Settlement 
in 1947.159  She was only eight years old.160 At the time, the Phillip 
Creek Settlement was run by the religious organization, the 
Aborigines Inland Mission (AIM) on behalf of the 
Commonwealth’s Native Affairs Department.161 Lorna, along with 
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156 Jennifer Clarke, Cubillo v. Commonwealth, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 218, 220 
(2001). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 228. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 228–29. 
2016] Killing the Policy to Save the Child 277 	  
	  
Amelia Shankelton who led the mission.162 She was then detained 
at AIM’s Retta Dixon Home in Darwin, also run by Shankelton.163 
Lorna, along with the others, alleged that she suffered harshness, 
physical abuse, and lack of affection at the Retta Dixon home until 
the age of eighteen.164 She finally left the home in October of 
1956.165 
 
b. Peter Gunner: A Background 
In 1956, when seven-year-old Peter Gunner was removed from 
his home, he was living in the “native” camp on the Utopia 
Pastoral Station in Central Australia.166At the time, he was in the 
care of his mother, Topsy Kundriba.167 Peter Gunner claimed that 
patrol officers forcibly removed him from his mother, 168 which 
Judge O’Laughlin found almost certainly true. 169  However, 
O’Laughlin found evidence that Peter's mother, Topsy, might have 
consented to the removal in order for him to get a “European” 
education.170 The patrol officer assured Topsy that Peter would be 
“home for the holidays.”171 Peter was placed in St. Mary’s Hostel, 
a home for part-Aboriginal children administered by the Australian 
board of missions.172 Peter stayed at St. Mary’s until 1962 when he 
left at the age of 14. 173 
  
c. Cubillo: The Arguments 
The plaintiffs Lorna Cubillo and Peter Gunner alleged that 
their removal and detention by the Director of Native Affairs, also 
known as Chief Protector, constituted wrongful imprisonment and 
deprivation of liberty. 174  Their case ultimately failed on all 	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accounts. They brought, among other things, a claim of false 
imprisonment, a breach of statutory duty by the Australian officials, 
and negligence by those officials. Judge O’Laughlin, who wrote 
the opinion, dismissed each of these claims one by one.  
 
i. False Imprisonment 
Cubillo and Gunner alleged that the Commonwealth promoted 
or caused their detention.175  The policy of Aboriginal removal, 
they argued, was carried out without regard to the children’s 
individual circumstances. 176  Remarkably, on these claims, 
O’Laughlin found two separate points. First, he found that the 
powers vested to the Director Native Affairs under the 1918 
Ordinance to remove children were broad enough that the 
detention of Peter Gunner and Lorna Cubillo could not be 
impeached.177 Second, O’Laughlin found that the Commonwealth 
failed to prove that Lorna Cubillo’s detention was a lawful exercise 
of the Director’s power under § 6 of the 1918 ordinance.178 This 
distinction led O’Laughlin to conclude: 
 
Mrs. Cubillo has established, prima facie, . . . a 
cause of action against the estate of [former 
Director of Native Affairs] Mr. Moy, [former 
Native Affairs patrol officer] Mr. Penhall, the estate 
of [former Retta Dixon Home Superintendent] Miss 
Shankelton and the Aborigines Inland Mission for 
false imprisonment based on her removal.179 
 
The finding that Lorna Cubillo had a prima facie case against 
the individuals that led to her imprisonment did not amount to a 
cause of action against the Commonwealth.180 If Cubillo had raised 
a lawsuit against the actual parties involved with her removal, she 
would have likely prevailed. However, the court held she did not 
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have a claim against the Commonwealth itself.181 Instead, a more 
appropriate claim would be against the Retta Dixon Home or the 
former superintendents of the home.  
 
ii. Breach of Statutory Duty 
The Commonwealth had argued, inter alia, that Cubillo and 
Gunner's claims for breach of statutory duty should not be 
sustained. 182 According to the Commonwealth, the evidence 
showed that the plaintiffs could not prove that the Commonwealth 
was directly involved in the removal or detention of either 
plaintiff. 183  O’Laughlin rejected the Commonwealth’s summary 
judgment motion.184 Judge O'Laughlin stated: 
 
I have come to the conclusion that the 
circumstances of both these cases are such that it 
would be appropriate to make a prima facie finding 
that Mrs. Cubillo and Mr. Gunner have private 
rights of action for breach of statutory duty 
available to them. I am persuaded to reach that 
preliminary conclusion as a result of the following 
factors: on the assumption that the applicants are 
able to prove an abuse or misuse of power on the 
part of the Commonwealth (or on the part of its 
servants or agents for whom it is vicariously 
responsible) the legislation provides no other 
remedy; the powers of the Director and (in the case 
of Mr. Gunner) the powers of the Director of Native 
Affairs are exceptionally wide and far-reaching in 
their affect [sic] upon the liberty and freedom of the 
individual — a feature that, in isolation, calls out 
for some form of review or supervision . . . . Next, 
the class of people who were affected by the 
legislation were [sic] clearly defined. It was limited 
in its application to Aboriginal persons and, later, 
with the advent of the Welfare Ordinance, to those 
persons who had been declared wards. Finally, it 
could not be said that one can describe, from a 	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reading of either the 1918 Ordinance or the Welfare 
Ordinance, a clear intention on the part of 
Parliament to take away a private right to seek 
redress from the courts.185 
 
Although the court rejected the Commonwealth’s summary 
judgment motion, O’Laughlin reasoned that the Commonwealth 
breached a duty but did not grant the plaintiffs relief under this 
claim.186 Part of the court’s reasoning stemmed from the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the Commonwealth’s breach of duty was in relation 
to its guardianship powers. The plaintiffs did not argue that the 
Director had breached his “public” duties to oversee and regulate 
the institutions where they were sent. 187  For O’Laughlin, these 
actions disposed of the breach of statutory duty by the 
Commonwealth.188 
 
iii. The Negligence Claim 
O’Laughlin separated the questions concerning duty of care 
into two categories: 1) those directly concerning duty of the 
Commonwealth, and 2) those vicariously concerning duty of the 
Directors.189 O’Laughlin declared that the Commonwealth did not 
owe the plaintiffs a duty of care. As well, O’Laughlin noted that no 
act or omission by the Commonwealth resulted in injury to the 
applicants as it did not enjoy the power of removal or detention, 
and, although the plaintiffs were vulnerable, it had not been 
established that the Commonwealth knew of the risk of harm.190 
 
iv. Take Away from Cubillo 
Cubillo illustrates one of the first instances where an 
Aboriginal plaintiff brought a claim against the Commonwealth 
and emphasizes two important takeaways. 191  First, was the 
difficulty of proving the claims against the government. At each 	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turn of the litigation, Judge O’Laughlin drew a distinction between 
the actions of the AIM and St. Mary’s hostel and that of the 
Director for Native Affairs. When distilled, his reasoning for 
stopping the suit was to suggest that the real defendants in the case 
should have been the homes and institutions who housed Lorna 
Cubillo and Peter Gunner. Under Australian law, the Australian 
government could not be held liable even though these institutions 
acted with the government’s blessing and endorsement. 
The second takeaway from Cubillo was a path forward for 
future litigation. Although the litigants were ultimately 
unsuccessful in their litigation, the court was willing to explore the 
possibility that other members of the Stolen Generations could file 
their own suits. Eventually, the courts would have to compensate 
members of the Stolen Generations. That opportunity came to 
fruition in the 2007 case of Lampard-Trevorrow v. South Australia.  
 
2. Trevorrow: Walking Across the Threshold 
The Lampard-Trevorrow case was decided seven years after 
Cubillo. The impact of the decision in Lampard-Trevorrow has not 
yet been fully explored by Aboriginal advocates, but it is clear that 
Lampard-Trevorrow represents one of the first cases where a 
member of the Stolen Generations successfully made a claim 
against the Australian government, albeit the South Australian 
State Government. If the decision in Cubillo represented the 
opening of a door to bring claims against the Australian 
government, Trevorrow represented a hallway behind the door for 
stolen generation members to successfully litigate against 
Australian state governments for abuses stemming from Aboriginal 
removal.  
 
a. Background of Bruce Allen Trevorrow 
Bruce Trevorrow was born on November 20, 1956 to Joseph 
Trevorrow and Thora Karpany. 192  The family, which included 
three other children, lived in a fringe dwelling outside of Melanie 
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in South Australia.193 In 1957, Bruce became ill, and his parents 
took him to the hospital. 194  Despite the lack of evidence of 
malnourishment or neglect, Bruce was subsequently fostered into 
the custody of Frank and Martha Davis without the consent of his 
parents. 195  Judge Gray, who oversaw Trevorrow’s suit against 
South Australia, noted that an officer of the Aboriginal Protection 
Board (AFB) authorized the transfer of Bruce from his parents to 
his foster parents.196 Thora’s requests for contact with Bruce were 
consistently ignored, even though, as Gray discovered established 
protocol at that time was for Bruce to have contact with his natural 
family.197 The judge also found that the AFB determined Thora 
was not to have contact with Bruce.198 
Ten years after Bruce was removed from his family, in May of 
1967, Trevorrow returned to his birth mother199 because Bruce’s 
foster parents would not take him back after he had visited his 
mother on school vacations. 200  Bruce was not even given the 
opportunity to say goodbye to his foster family.201 In time, Bruce 
started to have run-ins with the law, including a charge of larceny 
within 12 months of returning to his mother.202 Ample evidence 
suggests that Bruce suffered serious depression throughout his 
adult life, leading to alcohol abuse.203 When Judge Gray had an 
opportunity to hear the case, Bruce Trevorrow was living a 
generally unhappy life with his wife and four kids.204 
 
b. Trevorrow’s Suit Against South Australia 
Trevorrow sued the state of South Australia for misfeasance in 
public office, false imprisonment, breach of duty of care, and 
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breach of fiduciary and statutory duty of care.205 As a threshold 
question, the court had to determine if the state could be held 
responsible for the unlawful actions of its related entities and 
officials.206 This very question had defeated the lawsuit in Cubillo. 
However, this time, Judge Gray held that the statutory corporations 
in charge of the plaintiff were emanations of the state or acted as 
instruments of the state.207 Therefore, the court held that South 
Australia was vicariously liable for the actions and conduct of the 
department officers as a result of breach of the duty of care.208 
 
i. Misfeasance in Public Office 
Trevorrow’s assertion of misfeasance in public office 
represented the first time that the cause of action was raised by a 
Stolen Generations litigant.209Judge Gray had already found that 
because of the widely disseminated advice of the Crown Solicitor, 
the state, through its ministers and officers, was well aware that it 
was condoning unlawful acts by permitting the APB to remove 
Aboriginal children from their natural families. 210  Hence, the 
reason why Trevorrow was entitled “to damages for misfeasance in 
public office by those concerned with his removal and placement 
and more particularly the State as the body ultimately 
responsible.”211 
 
ii. Wrongful Imprisonment 
Trevorrow asserted that the AFB, effectively imprisoning the 
plaintiff and robbing him the freedom of movement, removed him 
from his parents without their consent.212 The court agreed, and 
held that the state, through its agents and emanations, caused the 
imprisonment by signing off on the transfer that led to Trevorrow’s 
separation from his parents.213  The ruling in Trevorrow, that a 	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litigant could successfully assert a wrongful imprisonment action 
against the government, represented a significant change from the 
ruling in Cubillo. In Cubillo, Lorna Cubillo was able to prove she 
had a case, but not against the Commonwealth. In Trevorrow, the 
court instead held the state liable for the actions of the department 
officials.214 
 
iii. Fiduciary Duty 
Trevorrow then claimed that, because the state government, 
acting through the AFB, had guardianship over him, this gave rise 
to a fiduciary relationship between himself and the AFB.215 The 
removal of an Aboriginal child from his family created a classic 
guardianship relationship between the state and Aboriginal 
children. 216  Judge Gray had held previously that the AFB was 
acting as the legal guardian of Trevorrow.217 The Judge then found 
that this established a fiduciary duty and that AFB breached that 
duty.218 This relationship stands in stark contrast to Cubillo where 
Judge O’Laughlin focused on a breach of duty for regulating the 
institutions, instead of the guardian relationship between the state 
and Mr. Trevorrow as an Aboriginal child.  
 
iv. Negligence 
Like Cubillo, the court needed to assess whether the state owed 
any common law duties to the plaintiff.219 Ultimately, the court 
found that South Australia not only had a common law duty of care 
to Trevorrow but that duty had been breached.220 This represented 
a very clear break from Judge Laughlin’s opinion in Cubillo. 
Through the theory of vicarious liability, Judge Gray connected 
South Australia through its AFP to the actions taken by the foster 
parents and other individuals who neglected Mr. Trevorrow. This 
would make South Australia liable for damages.   
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v. Damages 
The court held that Trevorrow was entitled to damages. 
However, according to Judge Gray, assessing those damages was 
difficult. 221  The court decided to take a holistic approach to 
administering damages.222 Judge Gray awarded Trevorrow a sum 
of $525,000 in damages with respect to his injuries and losses.223 
Additionally, Trevorrow was also awarded $75,000 in exemplary 
damages for his wrongful removal and detention.224 
 
vi. Takeaway in Trevorrow 
The critical takeaway from Trevorrow was the successful 
litigation of a claim by a member of the Stolen Generation. At the 
time of the decision, the outcome was hailed as a landmark case.225 
Numerous commentators placed the decision in the same 
classification as the famous Mabo v. Queensland case, in terms of 
its expansion of rights for the Aboriginal population.226 If Mabo 
had ignited legislative action on native title, perhaps Trevorrow 
could do the same with compensation for members of the Stolen 
Generation.227 
However, comparing these two cases results in a fundamentally 
flawed analysis. 228  In Mabo, the High Court of Australia had 
accepted, as truth, one version of history. 229  The court in 
Trevorrow followed a different version of the history of the 
removal of Aboriginal children. 230  The Trevorrow decision 
overturned a history of courtroom failures by Stolen Generations 
litigants.231 Although Trevorrow arrested a string of failures as it 
pertains to members of the Stolen Generation, its systemic value as 
precedent is still unclear.232 	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III. THE ROAD AHEAD: NEXT STEPS FOR AUSTRALIA AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
Despite the largely similar treatment of indigenous children, 
Australia and the United States have chartered largely different 
paths in addressing the historical ramifications of the removal of 
indigenous children. The paths ultimately show two schools of 
thought: forward-thinking preemptive legislative action and 
historical reconciliation of past grievances.  
The United States adopted the forward-thinking preemptive 
legislative action thought when it passed ICWA. ICWA was an 
attempt to stop future takings of Native American children by 
making it harder to remove Indian children from their homes. 
However, the Adoptive Girl v. Baby Girl decision represents the 
limitation of ICWA when it comes to the removal of Indian 
children. With the “existing Indian family” exception now a 
component of ICWA, how tribes and tribal members utilize the 
law will have to adapt to address the Adoptive Couple decision. 
The 2015 ICWA guidelines represent a start, but might not 
represent the best path forward.  
Australia’s path has been purely litigation. Members of the 
Stolen Generation, without a particular set of remedies, have 
pushed common law negligence claims with mixed results. Taken 
chronologically, the Cubillo and Trevorrow decisions can be 
viewed as evolution within the Australian courts that recognize 
cognizable claims on negligence grounds. However, within this 
string of cases, it is unclear whether Trevorrow will lead to more 
litigation by other members of the Stolen Generations. Further, 
Australia’s actions towards acknowledging and rectifying the past 
have culminated in a National Sorry Day;233  but no legislation 
similar to ICWA to respond to the near century-long of removal of 
Aboriginal children from their homes. The focus on litigation by 
Aboriginal citizens, instead of promoting legislative action like the 
tribes when passing ICWA, offers insight into how Aboriginal 
groups have not advocated for significant legislative reform. The 	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Cubillo and Trevorrow decisions also reveal something else: 
Aboriginal communities want past transgressions recognized, just 
as much as tribal communities in the United States want to 
recognize that even though the boarding school era is over, the 
removal of an Indian child from an Indian home echoes that 
historical narrative. Within this narrative, Australia and America 
can learn from one another. What appears to be clear is that for 
each country, the next logical step is new legislation addressing 
this specific issue. 
 
A. Australia: Evolving Legislation Towards an ICWA-like Solution 
Australia should, like the United States, pass legislation that 
addresses the Stolen Generations. The focal point of the Cubillo 
and Trevorrow litigation was to provide monetary compensation 
for the abuses suffered by Aboriginals at the hands of state-
sanctioned entities. But, the lessons of Cubillo and Trevorrow 
should note that prevailing in the litigation is not guaranteed. 
Therefore, Australia should pass legislation creating a uniform 
system to handling claims and paying out compensation. Such a 
move has precedent as the State of Tasmania already enacted the 
Stolen Generations of Aboriginal Children Act of 2006.234 Under 
the Act’s scheme, members of the Stolen Generations would be 
eligible for ex gratia payments from the Tasman government if 
they meet specific criteria. 235  Qualifying criteria include 
admittance to the State under the Infants’ Welfare Act 1935 prior 
to December 31, 1975,236 since the Act is designed to compensate 
the Stolen Generations specifically. If the applicant meets the 
requirements of the statute, then they would receive their 
payment. 237  Other states such as New South Wales and the 
Commonwealth itself could replicate the Tasmanian law. Focusing 
on a contrastive structure system where members of the Stolen 
Generations can be compensated for past atrocities could help the 
government avoid costly litigation.  
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But that might not be enough to completely rectify past 
transgressions. The lack of ICWA-type legislation causes problems 
within the family court system in handling current adoptions of 
Aboriginal children. The Australian Law Reform Commission is a 
federal agency that reviews Australia’s laws to improve access to 
justice.238 The Commission in the 1980s noted that there was a 
need for a child placement principle239 similar to that of ICWA. 
Part of the complexity goes to deep cultural differences: traditional 
Aboriginal custom does not recognize adoption.240 On top of the 
cultural problems, “[a]ny remedy proposed for problems of 
Aboriginal child custody and adoption will have to cope with the 
variety of forms placement or custody decisions can take in 
Australia, and with the complexity of the judicial and 
administrative arrangements for making such decisions.”241  
Therefore, the next step in rectifying the historical removal of 
Aboriginal children is to prevent unnecessary removals in the 
future. This could mean developing an Australian version of 
ICWA. Efforts to do just that have already begun on a state by 
state basis. In 1997, a report titled National Inquiry into the 
Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children and 
Their Families242  by the Australian Human Rights Commission 
looked into the implementation of the Aboriginal Child Placement 
Principle (ACPP). The reasoning behind the ACPP was to develop 
a set of policies and legislation that meets both the needs of the 
child and the needs of the indigenous community.243 They found 
that the implementation of the Aboriginal Child Placement 
Principle fell into three categories.244 New South Wales, Tasmania, 
Western Australia and Queensland fell into the first category: the 	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visited May 12, 2016). 
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242 HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, NATIONAL 
INQUIRY INTO THE SEPARATION OF ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER 
CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES, available at 
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ACPP is only recognized in policy.245 The policy directs officers of 
the respective state departments to follow the principles in the case 
of Aboriginal adoption, 246  but it is nonbinding on non-state 
adoption agencies. 247  Tasmania, South Australia, the Northern 
Territory and the Australian Capital Territory fall into the second 
category: ACPP has been adopted by legislation and is now law.248 
A highlight of the ACPP in these states: adoption is considered a 
last resort and instead efforts are made to place the Aboriginal 
children with another family member or within their community.249 
Finally, the state of Victoria is alone in the third category: in 
addition to applying the ACPP, the state has taken it a step further 
by mandating additional steps in the adoption process such as the 
relinquishing parent receiving counseling and requiring that the 
proposed adoptive parents be members of the same Aboriginal 
community.250 The Human Rights Commission fully supported the 
efforts of Victoria, and believes they should be adopted 
universally.251 
These three groups represent each stage in the evolution of 
Australian legislation concerning Aboriginal adoption. It would 
seem the obvious first step for states such as New South Wales and 
Queensland is to take the ACPP from policy to paper: full 
legislative implementation. For the states that have implemented 
the ACPP, the next step is to implement legislation that has similar 
features to the law in Victoria. While these are all good steps, the 
Australian government should look to ICWA as a model for a 
uniform set of laws. Although ICWA does create some discretion 
through the placement preferences, it creates series of clear steps 
when applying the statute.  
The uniformity of ICWA should be the primary takeaway for 
legislators and advocates in Australia. The call for uniformity is 
not new for Australia, as the Human Rights Commission called for 
national standards legislation as part of their recommendations for 	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Aboriginal adoption in 1997. 252  Uniformity, whether it is 
compensation for the Stolen Generations members or a new set of 
rules concerning Aboriginal adoption, would allow Australia to 
streamline the adoption process and mitigate litigation. By passing 
compensatory legislation, members of the Aboriginal community 
would have a better opportunity to gain compensation. That way, 
members can avoid unsuccessful litigation such as Cubillo. By 
enacting legislation that helps keep Aboriginal children within 
their communities, with adoption outside of the community as a 
last resort, these laws respect the cultural customs of the 
Aboriginal people. 
 
B. United States: Strengthening ICWA through an Act of Congress 
ICWA and the accompanying regulations are currently 
inadequate to address the lingering cultural impacts of the boarding 
school era. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl shows that even with 
robust legislation designed to keep Native American children 
within their tribal community, the ICWA is not always able to 
accomplish its goal. Justice Alito’s “existing family doctrine” 
creates a loophole in the law, which allows for more Native 
American children to be removed out of their communities, albeit 
in a less sinister fashion. Adoptive Couple should prompt 
Congressional action to tweak the ICWA to make it a more 
effective tool to keep Native American children within their Tribal 
community.  
The United States appears to have already begun addressing 
the issues created by Adoptive Couple and the “existing Indian 
family” exception. Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Kevin 
Washburn announced that the BIA was creating new ICWA 
regulations.253  As already stated among the many changes, the 
proposed BIA changes include clarifying that ICWA has no 
“Existing Indian Family” exception.254  The new proposed rules 	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appear to address the problems created by Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl. But, the proposed rules fall short in two respects. First, as 
Secretary Washburn has stated, the rules do not overrule Adoptive 
Couple.255  It is possible that, in future litigation, the U.S. Supreme 
Court would overrule the new regulations as being inconsistent 
with their ruling in Adoptive Couple. Second, the National Council 
for Adoption litigation indicates that strategic legislation to either 
defeat or chip away at ICWA’s protections is in effect. The lesson 
that advocates can draw from the experiences of Australia and the 
Cubillo/Trevorrow litigation is that without strong legislative 
action, litigation will continue.  
Therefore, the next step forward for ICWA advocates is new 
legislation that amends ICWA to strengthen it. Relying on 
Congress’ plenary jurisdiction,256 new sections should be written 
that address and eliminate the existing family doctrine and other 
defects in the law. By creating these new sections, the new rules 
and guidelines would rest on more solid ground because they 
would have specific legislative authority.  
More importantly, the new legislation would overcome and 
supersede the Adoptive Couple decision. Due to the unique nature 
of Indian law, an act of Congress, when directly on point, can 
directly overturn a Supreme Court ruling. This has already 
happened in regards to criminal jurisdiction. Generally, tribal 
criminal jurisdiction does not extend over non-members of the 
tribe as ruled in the Oliphant decision. 257  Congress expanded 
criminal jurisdiction after the decision in Duro v. Reina258 stated 
that the principles of Oliphant extended to non-member Indians.259 
Congress responded by amending the Indian Civil Rights Act260 
(ICRA) to affirmatively state that tribes have criminal jurisdiction 
over Indians even if they are not enrolled members of that tribe.261 	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This is known as the “Duro Fix”262 because the ICRA amendments 
were created in direct response to the Duro decision. When the 
Supreme Court addressed Congress’ attempt to extend jurisdiction, 
they affirmed that the law could expand the criminal jurisdiction 
and subsequently superseded their decision in Duro. 263  This 
experience creates a precedent for ICWA advocates and would 
address Secretary Washburn’s concerns about the new rules and 
their ability to overrule Adoptive Couple. New additions to the 
ICWA legislation would be able to supersede the Adoptive Couple 
decision and eliminate the “existing family doctrine” entirely. 
However, this legislation would not be able to cure all of the 
litigation. The first point of National Council for Adoptive Couple 
is based on the APA, not the specific language and powers under 
ICWA. The second point of the National Council for Adoption and 
the main point of A.D. v. Washburn are far more insidious. By 
going directly for a constitutional challenge, the plaintiffs in both 
of these cases hope to dismantle ICWA entirely. Even with a fix 
similar to Duro, it would be moot if the entire statute were struck 
down on 14th Amendment grounds. For advocates trying to 
strengthen ICWA and eliminate the “existing family doctrine,” the 
constitutional challenges are beyond their control. For instance, the 
U.S. Government filed a motion to dismiss in the National Council 
for Adoption litigation.264 While ICWA advocates cannot ignore 
the threat that National Council for Adoption and A.D. poses to 
ICWA, when addressing the specific issues created by Adoptive 
Couple, the best step forward is to continue to push for strong 
legislative action.  
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Like Australia, the United States is evolving with its legislation. 
While ICWA provides the next steps for Australia, the Adoptive 
Couple litigation provides an opportunity to strengthen the statute. 
The proposed 2015 ICWA guidelines provide a robust start to 
strengthening, but it might not be enough. Litigation based on the 
APA, as well as potential threats from the U.S. Supreme Court 
show that new language to ICWA provides the best way forward.  
There is an underlying issue with the legislative solution: the 
political will to see these changes through. It is unclear whether a 
coalition exists in either the U.S. Congress or the Australian 
Parliament that would want to see changes to ICWA or to codify 
the ACPP. For both countries, it makes sense to look at how the 
Association of American Indian Affairs was able to push through 
ICWA in the 1970s. That experience provides some framework 
proponents can use when crafting a strategy to pass legislation 
advocated in this Article.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The past policies of the United States and Australia had closely 
mirrored one another when it came to treatment of their respective 
indigenous populations. The separation of Native American and 
Aboriginal children was part of greater attempt to assimilate each 
group into the larger colonial society. The methodology used 
schools and other tools to separate thousands of native children, 
not only from their families, but from their culture as well. As 
some of the facts in the cases of litigants like Peter Gunner or 
Bruce Trevorrow demonstrate, the experience of separation from 
families and traditional communities was nothing short of 
abhorrent.  
After the abandonment of the removal policies, Australia, and 
the United States now walk divergent paths. The U.S., desperate 
not to repeat the problems of the past, has used the ICWA as a 
means to keep families and communities whole.  In many ways, 
this proactive approach attempts to shut the door on the removal 
policies for good. Australia, trying to reconcile its past with 
members of the Stolen Generations, is currently dealing with the 
legal ramifications of suits from those Generations. As Trevorrow 
shows, the country is moving toward allowing for compensation 
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for victims of the Aboriginal Protection Boards. However, there is 
resistance still to a full-fledged understanding of what happened to 
Aboriginal children during the time of the Stolen Generations. 
How can Australia and the United States benefit from each 
other’s experience? For these countries, whether it is the case of 
Adoptive Couple or Cubillo, a fundamental issue is when the law 
applies. In both instances, it appears legislative action would be 
prudent to strengthened the protections, and rights, of the 
indigenous populations of these countries. Legislative action is the 
next step for both Australia and America. Through legislation, both 
countries can better recognize and acknowledge historical 
atrocities by a) compensating for past transgression and b) 
ensuring future transgressions do not occur. For both countries, 
how to best accomplish these goals is found in the other’s 
experience addressing the issue. 
Australia’s next step in legislation is establishing a system 
similar to ICWA. Each state has addressed Aboriginal 
compensation and adoption in its own way. But going from 
Victoria to Tasmania to New South Wales, the current patchwork 
of laws is too inconsistent. Aboriginals in Tasmania have the 
opportunity to file for compensation for past transgressions while 
at the same time the ACPP has not signed into law. Across the 
water in Victoria, Aboriginals in that state do not have the ability 
to file for compensation for past transgressions, but they have the 
best laws in regards to Aboriginal adoption. Widespread adoption 
of Tasmania’s compensation law and Victoria’s Aboriginal 
adoption law would not only allow for a streamlined path to 
compensation for Stolen Generations but also address future 
removal of Aboriginal children in a culturally sensitive process. 
The United States is farther along than Australia in terms of 
legislative protections for Native American children. ICWA has 
served as a proven adoption model for four decades. The decision 
in Adoptive Couple and the litigation in National Council for 
Adoption and A.D. reveal the concerted efforts to limit the scope of 
ICWA as well as attempts to dismantle its entire regulatory scheme. 
Like Cubillo and Trevorrow, litigation in the United States shows 
that indigenous advocates are not consistently winning in the 
courts under the current regulatory scheme. Instead, legislative 
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action is required in strengthen the statutes under which they 
litigate. The plenary jurisdiction of Congress creates the path 
necessary to close loopholes within the current ICWA statute, like 
the existing family doctrine established in Adoptive Couple.  
What is certain is that both countries are trying to acknowledge 
and overcome their past. Both countries acknowledge the 
detrimental impacts that removing indigenous children from their 
homes has caused on both the indigenous communities and the 
children themselves. For Australia, the Stolen Generations remain 
an important part of the Aboriginal community, and they are not 
going away. For the United States, the path from Chief Justice 
Taney to ICWA was paved with racist attitudes, broken families, 
and broken communities. ICWA acts as a barrier from broken 
families and broken communities, but it is not a perfect statute. 
ICWA advocates can look to the lessons learned by Aboriginal 
advocates in Australia about the current perils of taking Aboriginal 
claims into court. Ultimately, both countries still need to improve 
their respective laws regarding Aboriginal children, but the path to 
a better future is in front of them. It’s now up to those countries to 
take the next step forward.  
The irony should not be lost on indigenous advocates that the 
best chance for a stronger system is going through Congress and 
the Australian Parliament. The boarding schools would not have 
happened without the blessing of Congress. The menagerie of 
missions and schools that took Aboriginal children operated under 
the auspices of the Aborigine Protection Boards, set up by the 
Australian government. That now the very institutions that set up 
the systematic removal of indigenous children represents the best 
chance of strengthening the current system of reparations and 
adoption gives pause. It makes one wonder aloud if the 
relationship of “a guardian to a ward” from Marshall’s words in 
Cherokee has actually changed. 
However, the world has changed. Chief Justice Taney’s words, 
describing the indigenous peoples as “inferior,” ring hollow in 
today’s world. Richard Pratt’s declaration that we must “kill the 
savage, save the man” no longer has a place as a serious policy 
position. Every single year, Australians are reminded of the 
government-sponsored systematic removal of Aboriginals from 
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their homes and communities. This should give advocates hope 
that while the path to getting these changes, to ICWA and the 
ACPP, will be difficult, it will not be a Sisyphean endeavor. 
